

VII

CLASSIFICATION OF ARTS IN ANTIQUITY

BY W. TATARKIEWICZ

The ideas current in the classical aesthetics of the Greeks were formulated for philosophical or everyday use, rather than for aesthetics itself. They seem aesthetically inadequate. However, they did play their part during the whole classical epoch, and it was only the Hellenistic era that, at least in part, substituted different ideas.

The three ideas of primary importance were those of beauty, of art, and of poetry.¹

1. In ancient Greece the idea of *beauty* was much broader than ours. It embraced not only paintings, statues, and musical compositions but also virtues and truth, action and thought—not only aesthetic beauty in the proper sense but also moral beauty. This conception of beauty was not modified until the last period of antiquity. That period was the first that distinguished aesthetic beauty proper, defining beauty as “pleasant harmony of parts and agreeable color,” that is, beauty in the narrower modern sense, the beauty of visible things.

2. The idea of *art* current in the classical Greek period was also much more general than ours, as it embraced “all works produced according to rules,” thus including not only the works of artists but also those of artisans and scholars.

3. The ideas of *beauty and art* were not associated with each other. If the statement that all art should aspire to beauty was made, it was only in a very wide and general sense; the meaning was that all production (which was called “art”) should aspire to perfection (which was called “beauty”). When defining beauty no one referred to art, and conversely, no one referred to beauty when defining art. Only the end of ancient times brought together the two ideas, beauty and art, and established the notion that for some arts aesthetic beauty was the aim.

4. The ideas of *art and poetry* were not associated in ancient times either, because the Greeks were persuaded that art is subject to rules, whereas poetry depends on inspiration. Poetry could not, therefore, be considered one of the arts. Only with the decline of antiquity were the two ideas brought together at last, when it became recognized that poetry was also subject to rules, and that inspiration was indispensable for the arts as well.

Ancient aesthetics embraced a long period; it progressed for more than eight centuries and gradually modified the earlier ideas of beauty and art. But whatever these changes were, there was always a lingering conviction that art was a rational knowledge based on general rules. Art was never considered in antiquity as production wholly dependent on inspiration or

¹ W. Tatarkiewicz, “Art and Poetry, A Contribution to the History of Ancient Aesthetics,” *Studia Philosophica* II (Leopoli, 1939). P. O. Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts,” this *Journal* (1951), 496-527; (1952), 17-46. W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia Estetyki* I (Breslau-Krakow, 1960).—I am happy to note that I am dealing with a subject which is also the concern of the eminent Columbia University scholar, Professor P. O. Kristeller.

intuition or phantasy. Plato expressed this idea in a classic manner when he said that he "does not call irrational work an art."²

Numerous attempts were made in antiquity to classify beauty and the arts. As the ancient ideas of beauty and art were broad and general, it was necessary to differentiate them in order to make them really useful, and especially to make them useful for aesthetics. The first attempts appeared as early as the Sophists. They were continued by Plato and Aristotle, and in the Hellenistic period as well. Between the Vth century B.C. and the IIIrd century A.D., Greeks and Romans often tried to differentiate and divide their general idea of arts by classifying them. The important thing for the history of aesthetics is to know whether these ancient classifications set apart the "fine arts," whether they distinguished art proper, on the one hand, and the works of artisans and scholars, on the other.

1. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SOPHISTS. The Sophists³ distinguished two categories of arts: those cultivated for the sake of their *utility*, and those cultivated for the *pleasure* they offer. In other words, they differentiated between arts which were necessary in life and those which were an amusement. This classification was successful. In the Hellenistic epoch, it was as widespread as it had been in the times of the Sophists. However, its significance for aesthetics is rather doubtful, because it did not contribute to distinguishing fine arts, which were placed partly among useful arts and partly among those cultivated for pleasure's sake. Architecture was considered as a useful art and painting as cultivated for pleasure's sake. From the point of view assumed by the Sophists, architecture and painting did not belong together.

The classification of the Sophists reappeared in a more developed form in Plutarch. To the arts necessary in life and those which serve pleasure, he added a third category: the arts cultivated for the sake of *perfection*. One might think that Plutarch's idea (suggested undoubtedly by Aristotle) would lead to the distinction of "fine arts" since these are certainly concerned with perfection. However, the examples he gives of the arts cultivated for the sake of perfection indicate that he was not thinking of fine arts at all. Among the arts cultivated for the sake of perfection he does not mention sculpture or music, but quite different human works: sciences, mathematics, and astronomy. It is clear that the first Greek attempts to classify arts had no aesthetic value.

2. THE CLASSIFICATION OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. Plato tried to classify arts in various ways. He distinguished, for instance, arts which like music were based on mathematics and those which were based only on simple experience. This division was taken up neither by his contemporaries nor by posterity. On the other hand, his two other suggestions concerning the classification of arts proved a great success.

The first one referred to the experience that different arts have different relations to real things: they either make use of them, as hunting does; or

² Plato, *Gorgias* 465 A.

³ Alcidamas, *Oratio de Sophistis* 10. Isocrates Panegyricus 40.—Anonym. In *Hermogenis De Statibus*, in: H. Rabe. Prolegomenon Sylloge, 121.

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imitate them, as painting does; or they produce things, as in architecture. Plato founded on this distinction the tripartite classification of arts which played an important rôle in ancient times: arts which *make use* of reality, arts which *produce* a new reality, and arts which *imitate* reality.⁴ However, Plato and his successors often passed over the arts which make use of things; they were mainly concerned with the two more important categories, of arts which produce and those which imitate, that is *productive* arts and *imitative* arts.

The other Platonic classification distinguished arts which produce *real things*, as architecture does, and arts which produce *only images*, as painting does.⁵ For Plato, however, this classification was in fact the same as the former. If arts imitate things they produce no more than images of them; therefore imitative arts are the same as those which produce images.

Aristotle⁶ differed little from Plato in his classification of arts. He divided the arts into those which *complete* nature and those which *imitate* it. This division allowed him to distinguish under the name of "imitative arts" at least a considerable number, if not all, of what we call the fine arts. From the point of view of aesthetics, this was certainly the most important of all the classifications of arts attempted in ancient times. However, Aristotle's principle for the classification of arts was different from that of modern times. He distinguished painting, sculpture, and poetry from other arts, not because they tend to beauty or express feelings—the modern point of view—but because they imitate reality. By doing so he turned ancient aesthetic thought in a direction different from that of modern aesthetics.

3. THE CLASSIFICATION OF GALEN. The classification of arts best known and most generally accepted in ancient times was a different one: it was the division of *vulgar* and *liberal* arts. It was an invention of the Greek spirit, though it is known mainly in the Latin terminology of "artes vulgares" and "artes liberales." It was based on the fact that certain arts require physical effort from which others are free, a difference that seemed to the ancient Greeks peculiarly important. The classification of arts based on this principle was, more than any other ancient classification, dependent on the historical and social conditions of Greece. It was the expression of an aristocratic regime, and of contempt for physical work. This contempt was manifested in the very name of the arts requiring physical effort: they were called "vulgares," and even "sordidae." The division of arts as vulgar and liberal was the expression of the Greek preference for activities of the mind, and it led to the interpretation of liberal or intellectual arts as forming not only a distinct, but also a superior group, known also as "honorable arts."

This distinction of vulgar and liberal arts appeared in antiquity very early, so early that it is impossible to indicate its author. We know only the names of later thinkers who accepted and developed it. One of them was Galen, the famous physician of the IInd century. His text is the most nearly complete and is quoted most often whenever this classification of

⁴ Plato, *Republica* 601 D. *Sophist* 219 A.

⁵ Plato, *Sophist* 235D-236C; 265B.

⁶ Aristoteles, *Physica* 199 a 15.

arts is mentioned, and it may therefore be called "Galen's classification."⁷

Which arts were considered as "liberal"? Among them Galen mentioned rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy—that is, sciences, and not what we consider arts. It is true, he also included music. However, he understood music less as an exercise in sounds than as the mathematical theory of acoustics. Both theory and practice were in antiquity scarcely distinguished in music. Galen hesitated as to where to place painting and sculpture. "If one wishes, one may consider them as liberal arts," he wrote. Such an attitude toward the arts confirms once more the statement made above that the ancient conception of art was very different from ours. No wonder that the ancient classification of arts was different too.

Later, the Greeks gave the "classification of Galen" a different terminology. They called the liberal arts "encyclic arts."⁸ The word "encyclic" (almost a synonym of "encyclopaedic," accepted in modern languages) means etymologically "encircling," "forming a closed circle," and here it signifies the assembly of arts, the closed circle of arts obligatory for an educated man. It must be understood that, to the ancients, encyclic arts embraced, above all, sciences and of arts, in the modern sense of the word, only music and rhetoric; they did not embrace painting and sculpture.

4. A VARIANT: THE CLASSIFICATION OF SENECA. The division of arts into vulgar and liberal (or encyclic) arts had several variants in ancient times, and there were some additions which enriched it. One of them has come to us through the works of Seneca.⁹ Its origin goes back to the philosophy of Poseidonius. To *vulgar* and *liberal* arts Seneca added those which *instruct* (*pueriles*) and those which *amuse* (*ludicrae*). Thus he fused two different classifications: that of Galen and that of the Sophists. The new division was fourfold; it was more complete, but it lacked unity.

5. CLASSIFICATION OF QUINTILIAN. We know another ancient classification from Quintilian,¹⁰ a Roman rhetorician of the 1st century. Applying the conceptions created by Aristotle for other reasons, he divided the arts into three groups. In the first group he included the arts which consist of study, knowledge, and appreciation of things (*inspectio, cognitio, et aestimatis rerum*), and do not require any sort of physical activity on the part of the artist. He called them "theoretical" arts, and gave as an example astronomy. To the second group belong, according to Quintilian, the arts which, on the contrary, are concerned with the action (*actus*) of the artist. This action is an end in itself and after it nothing remained (*ipso actu perficitur nihilque post actum operis relinquit*). Quintilian called them "practical arts" and gave the dance as an example. His third group embraced the arts which produce objects (*effectus*) that maintain their existence after the action of the artist is ended; these he called "poietic" (in the sense of "productive" arts—the Greek word "poiein" meaning "to produce") and painting served him as an example.

If we distinguish three elements in arts—the artist's knowledge, his

⁷ Galen, *Protrepticus* 14 (Marquardt 129).

⁸ *Scholia ad Dionys. Thrac.* in Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca* II, 654.

⁹ Seneca, *Epistolae*, 88, 21.

¹⁰ Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* II, 18, 1.

action, and the product of the action—we can say that Quintilian so divided arts that to the first group belonged arts which had only one of the elements (knowledge), to the second group arts which had two (the artist's knowledge and action), and to the third group (and only to the third group) arts which contain all three elements. The ancients considered the first element of knowledge as essential since it is common to all arts, to all three groups of them. And so they thought that the artist's knowledge was the essence of art. That is why they considered theoretical arts, which were in fact the same as sciences, as the most genuine arts. On the other hand, the modern view is that the artist's action and the product are the most essential elements in art and that purely theoretical arts are indeed not arts at all. Thus for Quintilian fine arts did not make a separate group of arts; for him they were partly in the second and partly in the third group.

It is probable that Quintilian did not invent his division of the arts, but owed it to the thinkers of preceding ages. Diogenes Laërtius attributed it to Plato. What he says is interesting in two respects. (A) He attributes this classification to Plato but considers it a classification of sciences, not of arts; he says that Plato divided the *sciences* into theoretical, practical, and poietic. And at the same time he gives architecture as an example of a poietic science, and playing the flute as that of a practical science. This is, however, easily explained, as the difference between sciences and arts was in antiquity always vague and indefinite. Still more striking is that (B) this division, attributed by Diogenes Laërtius¹¹ to Plato, is not to be found in any of Plato's writings. This in turn might be explained by the fact that the division of arts or sciences into theoretical, practical, and poietic was certainly adopted in later centuries by the Academy, and so the Greek historian considered himself justified in attributing it to the founder of the school.

If not in Plato's writings, the division of arts into the theoretical, the practical, and the poietic is at any rate to be found in Aristotle's writings. Aristotle, however, applied it differently, because he referred not only to three types of arts, but to three attitudes towards life.

6. TWO VARIANTS: THE CLASSIFICATIONS OF DIONYSIUS AND LUCIUS. Dionysius Thrax, a writer of the Hellenistic epoch, divided arts into practical and apotelestial; but this is the same division as that of Quintilian. The only difference is that poietic arts were now called "apotelestial." This word means "finished," "carried out to its end." R. Westphal,¹² a historian of ancient music, was the first to pay attention to Dionysius' division. He, however, attributed a different meaning to it: according to him "apotelestial" arts were those which the artist produces as finished, e.g. the works of a painter or of a sculptor, whereas practical arts, like music, need an executor, must be performed by a virtuoso. Westphal thought that this division was the most important of all imagined by ancient people, since it attained what others lacked, namely, (1) it separated from arts in the general sense of the word those which were fine arts, and (2) it divided these into two essentially

¹¹ Laërtius Diogenes, *De vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophorum*, Bk. III.

¹² R. Westphal, *Geschichte der alten und mittelalterlichen Musik* (1864).

different groups: painting and sculpture, on the one hand, and music, on the other. Westphal's interpretation does not seem to be justified; it interprets ancient terms by modern thought. Dionysius' concern was much simpler: his classification did not differ from the simple division of Quintilian. Let us add that the complete classification of Dionysius Thrax was four-fold,¹³ because it took into account not only "practical" and "apoteleptic," but also "theoretic" and "peripoietic" arts; by "peripoietic" arts he meant the group of arts, already noticed by Plato, that simply make use of nature, like fishing or hunting, without producing anything new.

Lucius Tarrhaeus, a grammarian quoted by Dionysius, invented another variant of the same classification, adding to the practical and apoteleptic arts "organic" arts,¹⁴ i.e. arts which use instruments or tools (Greek "organon"), as e.g. playing the flute. Thus what Quintilian called "practical" arts were separated into two groups: the group of arts using instruments (organic arts), and those which do not use them. For the latter he reserved the name "practical" arts.

Dionysius and Lucius enriched Quintilian's classification, the first of them by adding "peripoietic" arts, the other one by adding "organic" arts. But while enriching it, they deprived it to some extent of its unity.

7. THE CLASSIFICATION OF CICERO. Cicero used several classifications of the arts based on the old Greek tradition, especially (a) that of vulgar and liberal arts, and (b) that of arts cultivated for the sake of utility, and of arts cultivated for the sake of amusement. But he also invented new classifications. Taking as the basis of division the importance or significance of arts, he divided them into *major* (*artes maximae*), *mean* (*artes mediocres*), and *minor* (*minores*). To the major arts belonged, according to him, political and warlike arts; to the second class, purely intellectual arts, i.e. sciences, but also poetry and eloquence; to the third class, all the other arts: painting, sculpture, music, acting, athletics. In this way, the majority of fine arts were found in the lowest category, and this is a proof that the ancients did not value highly the very arts in which they attained perfection.

Cicero also gave an outline of another division: the *arts of speech* and the *mute arts* (*artes mutae*).¹⁵ To the first class belonged poetry, eloquence, and music; to the second class, painting and sculpture. This division is just mentioned incidentally in his writings, and it was not adopted in ancient times. It is, however, of great importance from the modern point of view, since it is concerned mostly with fine arts, and distinguishes two main categories among them.

8. THE CLASSIFICATION OF PLOTINUS. At the end of antiquity Plotinus undertook the problem of the classification of arts again. He invented two different classifications. In the fourth Ennead¹⁶ he divided the arts according to their instruments. From this point of view he distinguished three categories: those arts which make use of the forces of nature, those which

¹³ *Scholia ad Dionys. Thrac.*, in Bekker, 16, II, 670.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 652.

¹⁵ Cicero, *De Oratore* III, 7, 26.

¹⁶ Plotinus, *Ennead* IV, 4, 31.

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use their own instruments, and last of all *psychagogic* arts which use only mental instruments. The arts in the first category resemble those distinguished by Plato, and were similar to those called "peripoietic" by Dionysius; the arts in the second category were identical with the "organic" arts of Lucius Tarrhaeus; but this threefold division was Plotinus' own idea.

There is another classification by Plotinus¹⁷ in the fifth Ennead: it is in a sense the most complete of all classifications inherited from ancient times. It distinguished: (1) arts which produce physical objects, such as architecture; (2) arts which help nature, like medicine and agriculture; (3) arts which imitate nature, like painting; (4) arts which improve or ornament human action, like rhetoric, politics, military arts; and (5) purely intellectual arts, like geometry.

This second classification of Plotinus may seem to be lacking in a "principium divisionis," being rather an enumeration of different categories of arts than a real classification. If, however, we consider the philosophical ideas of Plotinus, we see that this classification has a foundation and an important one. It takes as a principle the degree of spirituality in arts; it forms a hierarchy beginning with architecture, which was for Plotinus the least intellectual and spiritual, and ending in geometry, which is intellectual and spiritual in the highest degree.

EIGHT CLASSIFICATIONS. Summarizing, Greek-Roman antiquity knew at least eight classifications of arts. The first one, inaugurated by the Sophists, had as its basis the *aim of arts*, and from this point of view it distinguished, on the one hand, the arts which were useful or necessary in life, and on the other hand, the arts which served human pleasure and amusement.

The second classification, formulated by Plato and by Aristotle, took as its basis the *relation between arts and reality*, and distinguished the arts which produce real things from those which produce only images; or, in other words, those which complete nature from those which imitate it.

The third classification, very widespread in the classic world, divided arts from the point of view of the activity (*mental or physical*) which was required of those who cultivated them. The arts which demanded only mental activity were called liberal or encyclic; whereas the others were called vulgar.

The fourth classification, known to us through Quintilian, took as its basis the *degree of realization* pertaining to the arts. From this point of view the arts were divided into theoretical, practical, and productive (*poietic*).

The fifth, formulated by Cicero, took as its basis the theoretical *value* and dignity of arts, and from this point of view it divided arts into major, mean, and minor.

The sixth, which comes also from Cicero and seems to be his own invention, divided arts according to the *material* which they use. From this point of view it distinguished the arts of speech and mute arts.

The seventh classification, that of Plotinus, divided arts according to their *instruments* into natural, artificial, and mental arts.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, V, 9, 11.

Lastly, the eighth one, which comes also from Plotinus seems to have as its basis the *degree of spirituality* and of transcendence in arts. This classification, which distinguished productive arts, the arts which improve nature, imitative arts, the arts which introduce beauty into human action, and mental arts seems to have formed for Plotinus a hierarchy of arts more and more spiritual, further and further away from the immanent world towards the transcendent world.

ANCIENT CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE ARTS

BY:	INTO:	FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF:
1. The Sophists	useful and pleasurable arts	the aim of art
1a. Plutarch	useful, pleasurable, and perfect arts	
2. Plato	productive and imitative	the relation to reality
2b. Plato	real and imaginative	
2c. Aristotle	completing and imitating nature	
3. Galen	liberal and vulgar	physical effort
3a. Seneca	encyclic, vulgar, instructing, and amusing	
4. Quintilian	theoretical, practical, and poietic	degree of realization
4a. Dionysius Thrax	theoretical, practical, apoteleptic, and peripoietic	
4b. Lucius Tarrhæus	practical, apoteleptic, and organic	
5. Cicero	major, mean, and minor	value
6. Cicero	speaking and mute	matter
7. Plotinus	using forces of nature, using instruments, and purely psychagogic	instruments
8. Plotinus	producing physical objects, helping nature, imitating nature, improving human activity, and purely intellectual	degree of spirituality

It is possible to cite other ancient classifications; however, they are but combinations of those eight fundamental ones. Thus the classification of Poseidonius and Seneca which distinguished four kinds of arts—vulgar, liberal, arts for the sake of amusement, and those for the sake of instruction—united two of the classifications given above, the first and the third. The most important of all ancient classifications—the first three—were formed at the beginning of Greek thought. The others, especially the fourth and the seventh, were formed later, but had their beginnings in Plato's and Aristotle's writings. These eight classifications of course vary greatly in historical importance. Only two among them—the first, which divided arts according to their aim, and the third, which divided them according to the artist's functions—were widespread; the second, which classified arts according to their relation to reality, was appreciated, but only in the milieu of scholars.

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ART AND POETRY. The way in which the Greeks *cultivated* arts shows a profound duality. Their arts formed two great distinct groups: on the one hand, *expressive* arts, such as poetry, music and dance; on the other hand, *contemplative* arts, which took in sculpture, poetry, and architecture. The Greeks realized what separated the two groups, but they did not realize what united them. They did not consider them two different modes of the same human activity but two distinct activities. They had no name, no idea which would embrace all of them. Nietzsche to some extent noticed the duality of the Greek conception of arts when he distinguished Dionysian and Apollonian arts.

There is one striking thing here: none of the ancient authors referred to this duality, none of them classified arts into these two groups of expressive and contemplative arts. This may seem strange. It is not, however, difficult to explain, for the ancients did not consider expressive arts as arts in the proper sense of the word. What we call by this name corresponded rather to their idea of poetry than to their idea of art. The fundamental duality which we see in their conception of the arts expressed itself in another way: not as opposition between contemplative and expressive arts, but as opposition between art and poetry.

FINE ARTS. And now the main result of what has been said above is that despite the numerous ancient classifications of the arts none of them separated out what is most important for aesthetics; none faced the possibility that fine arts could form a distinct group of arts. There may be a certain affinity between our notion of fine arts and the ancient notions of liberal arts, of arts for amusement's sake, of 'poietic' arts. But all these ancient notions were broader than the notion of fine arts, and at the same time, narrower. Some of the liberal arts, some of the amusing arts, some of the productive arts belonged to fine arts, but not all. Neither freedom, nor amusement, nor productiveness is the property by which one can define arts and distinguish them from crafts. Among ancient classifications that which came nearest to modern ideas was the one dividing arts into productive and imitative, but the lack of precision in the ancient idea of imitation diminished the importance of the classification.

There are at least three reasons which lead the *moderns* to the distinction of fine arts: they aspire to beauty, they express feelings, and they are directed by imagination. The first—that of beauty—could not be adopted by the Greeks because they demanded beauty in all arts, in craftsmanship as well as in fine arts. They were entitled to do so, because they understood beauty in a wide sense, closer to what the moderns call perfection than to what they call beauty. The second—that of expressing feelings—the Greeks of the classic period applied only to poetry and music, never to sculpture and painting. The last—that of imagination—well known to ancient psychology and aesthetics, was never applied to the classification of arts, because in earlier times the ancients did not associate imagination with human production, and later on they associated it with *every* human production and not only with fine arts.

"TECHNE" AND "SOPHIA." The ancient conception of "techne" only partly approached what we understand by "art": it embraced craftsmanship and sciences as well as arts. Another ancient idea somewhat closer to the modern view: it was the conception of wisdom (*sophia*). At the beginning this word meant not only the creative gift of penetrating the mysteries of the universe and of life, but also the ability to compose poems, to form statues, to construct buildings. In the Vth century B.C. the name sage (*sophos*) was given to thinkers as well as to artists. Later on, the sense of the word was limited, and it then meant only a thinker. In the Vth or IVth century B.C. *sophia* was to signify only the art of knowing the essential truths about life. At the end of the ancient period at least one connoisseur of art, Philostratus the Elder,¹⁸ realized that sculpture and painting were different from craftsmanship. When he wanted to distinguish them by a different name, he had recourse to that old term *sophia*. Art (*techne*) was for him any ability to produce correctly any object; wisdom (*sophia*) was something more. He did not define this "something more," but he enumerated the domains of wisdom: poetry, music, painting, sculpture. This was, perhaps, the first time in antiquity that fine arts were assembled and enumerated. For the first time they were given a common name, that of *sophia*. It is true that for Philostratus *sophia* was not limited to fine arts, for it also embraced philosophy, geometry, astronomy, and the art of warfare. His conception of *sophia* did indeed eliminate craftsmanship, but it embraced sciences as well as fine arts. One might object that when opposing "*technai*" and "*sophiai*" he simply gave another name to the ancient opposition of vulgar and liberal arts. But the difference was essential. Production was liberal if it was free from physical effort. The criterion of the liberal arts was *negative*. Now with Philostratus the criterion of *sophia* became *positive*: he demanded a *mental effort* for it. No more than other ancient authors did he distinguish fine arts from other human productions. But he assembled all the fine arts under one conception. If we are to believe the sources, he was the only one who did so in ancient times.

The predecessors of Philostratus did not arrive at the concept of "fine arts" because they failed (1) to distinguish them from craftsmanship, (2) to distinguish them from sciences, and (3) to realize that they have common properties, that sculpture, painting, poetry, and music are similar in nature. Philostratus distinguished fine arts from craftsmanship, but not, as we have seen, from sciences. Differences and affinities of human production, which are truisms for modern thought, were overlooked by antiquity. But not only by antiquity, for they were not noticed either by the Middle Ages or by the Renaissance. The merit of the Renaissance was only to separate the fine arts from craftsmanship. In the XVIIth century they were also separated from the sciences. But, as P. O. Kristeller has shown,¹⁹ it was only the XVIIIth century which recognized, at last, that poetry, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, and dance belong to the same category of arts. How can we blame the Greeks for not knowing what modern thinkers 2,000 years later did not know either?

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¹⁸ Philostratus, *De Gymnastica* I (261 k).

¹⁹ See above, fn. 1.

PHILOSOPHY

The various descriptive treatises of classical antiquity of these theories in medieval literature; these theories are identifiable with the second type of theory. The purpose among the Renaissance is to go back to the ancients, and write however these theories are contained in them, can perceive a renaissance.

Plato's influence is of seminal importance in discussing the re-emerging cosmic and the *Sophistic* nature.

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¹These are the Classical Antiquity.

²The meaning of the term in the sense of attempting to reflect materialistic force